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Abstract
We investigate the Goldreich-Levin Theorem in the context of quantum information. This
result is a reduction from the computational problem of inverting a one-way function to the
problem of predicting a particular bit associated with that function. We show that the quantum
version of the reduction—between quantum one-way functions and quantum hard-predicates—is
quantitatively more efficient than the known classical version. Roughly speaking, if the one-way
function acts on n-bit strings then the overhead in the reduction is by a factor of O(n/ε2) in the
classical case but only by a factor of O(1/ε) in the quantum case, where 1
2
+ ε is the probability
of predicting the hard-predicate. Moreover, we prove via a lower bound that, in a black-box
framework, the classical version of the reduction cannot have overhead less than Ω(n/ε2).
We also show that, using this reduction, a quantum bit commitment scheme that is per-
fectly binding and computationally concealing can be obtained from any quantum one-way
permutation. This complements a recent result by Dumais, Mayers and Salvail, where the bit
commitment scheme is perfectly concealing and computationally binding. We also show how to
perform qubit commitment by a similar approach.
1 Introduction
Fast quantum algorithms are potentially useful in that, if quantum computers that can run them
are built, they can then be used to solve computational problems quickly. Algorithms can also be
the basis of reductions between computational problems in instances where the underlying goals
are different from fast computations. For example, reductions are often used as indicators that
certain problems are computationally hard, as in the theory of NP-completeness (see [12] and
references therein). Another domain where reductions play an important role is in complexity-
based cryptography, where a reduction can show that breaking a particular cryptosystem is as
difficult (or almost as difficult) as solving a computational problem that is presumed to be hard.
We investigate such a cryptographic setting where quantum algorithms yield different reductions
than are possible in the classical case: the so-called Goldreich-Levin Theorem [13]. This result is
a reduction from the computational problem of inverting a one-way function to the problem of
predicting a particular hard-predicate associated with that function. Roughly speaking, a one-way
function is a function that can be efficiently computed in the forward direction but is hard to
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compute in the reverse direction, and a hard-predicate of a function is a bit that can be efficiently
computed from the input to the function and yet is hard to estimate from the output of the function.
We show that the quantum version of the reduction is quantitatively more efficient than the known
classical version. Moreover, we prove via a lower bound that, in a black-box framework, the classical
version of the reduction cannot be made as efficient as the quantum version.
Goldreich and Levin essentially showed that, for a problem instance of size n bits, if their hard-
predicate can be predicted with probability 12 + ε with computational cost T then the one-way
function can be inverted with computational cost O(T D(n, ε)), where D(n, ε) is polynomial in
n/ε. Taken in its contrapositive form, this means that, if inverting the one-way function requires
a computational cost of Ω(T ), then predicting the hard-predicate with probability 12 + ε requires
a computational cost of Ω(T/D(n, ε)). Note that if we start with a specific lower bound of Ω(T )
for inverting the function then we end up with a weaker lower bound—by a dilution factor of
D(n, ε)—for breaking the hard-predicate. In [14], it is shown that the dilution factor can be as
small as O(n/ε2).
We show that there is a quantum implementation of the reduction where the dilution factor is
only O(1/ε). We also show that Ω(n/ε2) is a lower bound on the dilution factor for any classical
implementation of the reduction in a black-box framework. In the standard parameterization of
interest in cryptography, T is assumed to be superpolynomial in n and ε ∈ 1/nO(1). In this case,
although 1/ε is smaller than n/ε2, the diluted computational cost, T/D(n, ε), remains superpoly-
nomial in both cases. However, there are other parameterizations where the difference between
the achievable quantum reduction and best possible classical reduction is more pronounced. One
example is the case where T = n3 and ε = 1/n. If we start with a classical one-way function
that requires a computational cost of Ω(n3) to invert and apply the Goldreich-Levin Theorem to
construct a classical hard-predicate then the reduction implies only that the computational cost of
predicting the predicate with probability 12 +
1
n is lower bounded only by a constant. However, if
we start with a quantum one-way function that requires a computational cost of Ω(n3) to invert
and apply our quantum version of the Goldreich-Levin Theorem then the computational cost of
predicting the predicate with probability 12 +
1
n is lower bounded by Ω(n
2).
A particular application of hard-predicates is for bit commitment. Recall the now well-known
result that an information theoretically secure bit commitment scheme cannot be based on the
information-theoretic properties of quantum devices alone [16, 17]. Of course, this is also the case
with classical devices, though computationally secure bit commitment schemes have been widely
proposed, investigated, and applied. Such schemes can be based on the existence of one-way per-
mutations. Most of these proposed one-way permutations are hard to invert only if problems such
as factoring or the discrete logarithm are hard, and are insecure against quantum computers, which
can efficiently solve such problems [18]. Recently, Dumais, Mayers and Salvail considered the possi-
bility of quantum one-way permutations [11], and showed how to base quantum bit commitment on
them (see also [10]). Their scheme is perfectly concealing and computationally binding, in the sense
that changing a commitment is computationally hard if inverting the permutation is hard. We
exhibit a complementary quantum bit commitment scheme that is perfectly binding and computa-
tionally concealing. As with hard-predicates, the dilution factor in the measure of computational
security is lower than possible with the corresponding classical construction. Furthermore, a pos-
sible advantage of our protocol is that the information that must be communicated and stored
between the parties consists of O(n) classical bits for bit commitment (and O(n) classical bits plus
one qubit for qubit commitment), whereas the scheme in [11] employs O(n) qubits.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we investigate a simple black-box
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problem that is related to the Goldreich-Levin Theorem. In Section 3, we give definitions pertain-
ing to one-way permutations and hard-predicates (classical and quantum versions) and investigate
the complexity of reductions from the former to the latter (applying results from Section 2). In
Section 4, we show how to use the Goldreich-Levin Theorem to construct a perfectly binding and
computationally concealing quantum bit commitment scheme from a quantum one-way permuta-
tion.
2 A black-box problem
Our results about the Goldreich-Levin Theorem (which are in Section 3) are based on the query
complexity of the following black-box problem, which we refer to as the GL problem (see, e.g., [2]).
Let n be a positive integer and ε > 0. Let a ∈ {0, 1}n and let information about a be available
only from inner product and equivalence queries, which are defined below in the classical case (and
later on generalized to the case of quantum information).
Definition 1 A classical inner product (IP) query (with bias ε) has input x ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs
a bit that is slightly correlated with a · x (the inner product of a and x modulo two) in the sense
that
Pr
x
[IP(x) = a · x] ≥ 12 + ε. (1)
The above probability is with respect to a random1 x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Definition 2 An quantum equivalence (EQ) query has input x ∈ {0, 1}n, and the output is 1 if
x = a and 0 otherwise.
The goal is to determine a with a minimum number of IP and EQ queries. A secondary resource
under consideration is the number of auxiliary bit/qubit operations. It should be noted that, when
ε = 12 , this is essentially equivalent to a problem that Bernstein and Vazirani [3] considered, where
IP queries return a · x on input x. For this problem, n IP queries are necessary and sufficient
to solve it classically; however, it can be solved with a single (appropriately defined) quantum IP
query. (See also [19].) When ε is small—say, ε ∈ 1/nO(1)—an efficient classical solution to this
problem is nontrivial. The correctness probability of an IP query for a particular x cannot readily
be amplified by simple techniques such as repeating queries; for some x, IP(x) may always be wrong.
Goldreich and Levin [13] were the first to (implicitly) solve this problem with a number of queries
and auxiliary operations that is polynomial in n/ε—and this is the basis of their cryptographic
reduction in Theorem 4.
We show that any classical algorithm solving the GL problem with constant probability must
make Ω(n/ε2) queries (for a reasonable range of values of ε), whereas there is a quantum algorithm
that solves the GL problem with O(1/ε) queries. For the quantum version of the GL problem, quan-
tum IP and EQ queries are defined (in Definitions 3 and 4) as unitary operations that correspond
to Definitions 1 and 2 in a natural way. We begin with the classical lower bound.
1Unless otherwise specified, a “random” element of a set means with respect to the uniform distribution.
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Theorem 1 Any classical probabilistic algorithm solving the GL problem with success probability
δ > 0 requires either more than 2n/2 EQ queries or Ω(δn/ε2) IP queries when ε ≥ √n2−n/3.
Proof: The proof uses classical information theory, bounding the conditional mutual information
about an unknown string that is revealed by each IP query, in conjunction with an analysis of the
effect of EQ queries.
It is useful to consider an algorithm to be successful on a particular input if and only if it
performs an EQ query whose output is 1 (at which point the value of a has been determined).
We begin by showing that it is sufficient to consider algorithms (formally, decision trees) that
are in a convenient simple form. First, by a basic game-theoretic argument [20], it suffices to
consider deterministic algorithms, where their input data—embodied in the black-boxes for IP and
EQ queries—may be generated in a probabilistic manner. Second, it can be assumed that all EQ
queries occur only after all IP queries have been completed. To see why this is so, start with an
algorithm that interleaves IP and EQ queries, and modify it as follows. Whenever an EQ query
occurs before the end of the IP queries, the modified algorithm stores the value of the input to the
query and proceeds as if the result were 0. Then, at the end of the IP queries, each such deferred
EQ query is applied. The modified algorithm will behave consistently whenever the actual output
of a deferred EQ query is 0, and also it will perform (albeit later) any EQ query where the output
is 1. Henceforth, we consider only algorithms with the above simplifications.
Now we describe a probabilistic procedure for constructing the black boxes that perform IP
and EQ queries. First, a ∈ {0, 1}n is chosen randomly according to the uniform distribution. Then
a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n is chosen randomly, uniformly subject to the condition that |S| = (12 + ε)2n
(assuming that ε2n is an integer). Then
IP(x) =
{
a · x if x ∈ S
a · x if x 6∈ S (2)
and
EQ(x) =
{
1 if x = a
0 if x 6= a. (3)
Consider an algorithm that makes m IP queries. If m ≥ δn/ε2 then the theorem is proven.
Otherwise, since ε ≥ √n2−n/3, we have
m <
δn
ε2
≤ δ22n/3. (4)
We proceed by determining the amount of information about a that is conveyed by the applica-
tion ofm IP queries. Let A be the {0, 1}n-valued random variable corresponding to the probabilistic
choice of a ∈ {0, 1}n, and let Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym be the {0, 1}-valued random variables corresponding
to the respective outputs of the m IP queries. Let H be the Shannon entropy function (see, e.g.,
[9]). Then, for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
H(A|Y1, Y2, . . . , Yi) = H(A|Y1, . . . , Yi−1)−H(Yi|Y1, . . . , Yi−1) +H(Yi|A,Y1, . . . , Yi−1). (5)
Combining the above equations yields
H(A|Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym) = H(A) +
m∑
i=1
(H(Yi|A,Y1, . . . , Yi−1)−H(Yi|Y1, . . . , Yi−1)) . (6)
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We shall now bound each term on the right side of Eq. 6. Since the a priori distribution of A is
uniform, H(A) = n. Also, since the entropy of a single bit is at most 1, H(Yi|Y1, . . . , Yi−1) ≤ 1 for
all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Next, we show that, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
H(Yi|A,Y1, . . . , Yi−1) ≥ 1− (16/ ln 2)ε2. (7)
To establish Eq. 7, it is useful to view the set S as being generated during the execution of the IP
queries as follows. Initially S is empty, and when the first IP query is performed on some input x,
x is placed in S with probability 12 + ε and in S with probability
1
2 − ε. The inputs to subsequent
IP queries are also placed in either S or S with an appropriate probability, which depends on how
the inputs to previous queries are balanced between S and S. After the execution of the first i− 1
queries, the input to the ith query is placed in S with probability
(12 + ε)2
n − j
2n − (i− 1) , (8)
where j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i− 1} is the number of previous inputs to queries that have been placed in S.
Using Eq. 4, the above probability can be shown to lie between 12 − 2ε and 12 + 2ε. It follows that
H(Yi|A,Y1, . . . , Yi−1) ≥ H(12 + 2ε, 12 − 2ε)
= −(12 + 2ε) log(12 + 2ε) − (12 − 2ε) log(12 − 2ε)
≥ 1− (16/ ln 2)ε2, (9)
establishing Eq. 7. Now, substituting the preceding inequalities into Eq. 6, we obtain
H(A|Y1, . . . , Ym) ≥ n− (16/ ln 2)mε2. (10)
Intuitively, the IP queries yield information about the value of A in terms of their effect on the
probability distribution of A conditioned on the values of Y1, . . . , Ym. Eq. 10 lower bounds the
decrease in entropy possible.
From the conditions of the theorem, it can be assumed that, after the IP queries, 2n/2 EQ are
performed. The algorithm succeeds with probability at least δ only if there exist 2n/2 elements of
{0, 1}n whose total probability (conditioned on Y1, . . . , Ym) is at least δ. The maximum entropy
that a distribution with this property can have is for a bi-level distribution, where 2n/2 elements of
{0, 1}n each have probability δ/2n/2 and 2n−2n/2 elements each have probability (1−δ)/(2n−2n/2).
Therefore,
H(A|Y1, . . . , Ym) ≤ H
(
δ
2n/2
, . . . , δ
2n/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n/2
, 1−δ
2n−2n/2 , . . . ,
1−δ
2n−2n/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n−2n/2
)
= H(δ, 1 − δ) + δ log(2n/2) + (1− δ) log(2n − 2n/2)
< 1 + δn/2 + (1− δ)n
= n− δn/2 + 1. (11)
Combining Eq. 10 with Eq. 11, yields m > (ln 2)(δn − 2)/(32ε2) ∈ Ω(δn/ε2), as required.
We now provide definitions of IP and EQ queries in the quantum case in terms of unitary
operations. We do this in a manner that is sufficiently general so that, whenever an implementation
of a more general IP or EQ query is given as a general quantum circuit consisting of elementary
quantum gates and measurements, a unitary query corresponding to our definition can be efficiently
constructed from it.
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Definition 3 A quantum inner product query (with bias ε) is a unitary transformation UIP on
n+m qubits, or its inverse U †IP, such that UIP satisfies the following two properties:
1. If x ∈ {0, 1}n is chosen randomly according to the uniform distribution and the last qubit of
UIP|x〉|0m〉 is measured, yielding the value w ∈ {0, 1}, then Pr[w = a · x] ≥ 12 + ε.
2. For any x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}m, the state of the first n qubits of UIP|x〉|y〉 is |x〉.
The first property captures the fact that, taking a query to be a suitable application of UIP followed
by a measurement of the last qubit, Eq. 1 is satisfied. Any implementation of a quantum circuit
that produces an output that is a ·x with probability on average 12 + ε can be modified to consist of
a unitary stage UIP followed by a measurement of one qubit. The second property is for technical
convenience, and any unitary operation without this property can be converted to one that has
this property, by first producing a copy of the classical basis state |x〉. Moreover, given a circuit
implementing UIP, it is easy to construct a circuit implementing U
†
IP.
Definition 4 A quantum equivalence query is the unitary operation UEQ such that, for all x ∈
{0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1},
UEQ|x〉|b〉 =
{ |x〉|b〉 if x = a
|x〉|b〉 if x 6= a, (12)
where b = ¬b.
For the quantum GL problem, a ∈ {0, 1}n and information about a in available only from
quantum IP and EQ queries and the goal is to determine a. We can now state and prove the result
about quantum algorithms for the GL problem (which is similar to a result in [8] in a different
context).
Theorem 2 There exists a quantum algorithm solving the GL problem with constant probability
using O(1/ε) UIP, U
†
IP and UEQ queries in total. Also, the number of auxiliary qubit operations
used by the procedure is O(n/ε).
Proof: The proof is by a combination of two techniques: the algorithm in [3] for the exact case
(i.e., when ε = 12), which is shown to be adaptable to “noisy” data in [8] (with a slightly different
noise model than the one that arises here); and amplitude amplification [5, 15, 6].
Since UIP applied to |x〉|y〉 has no net effect on its first n input qubits, for each x ∈ {0, 1}n,
UIP|x〉|0m〉 = |x〉 (αx|vx〉|a · x〉+ βx|wx〉|a · x〉) , (13)
where αx and βx are nonnegative real numbers, and |vx〉 and |wx〉 are m− 1 qubit quantum states.
If the last qubit of UIP|x〉|0m〉 is measured then the result is: a · x with probability α2x, and a · x
with probability β2x. Therefore, since, for a random uniformly distributed x ∈ {0, 1}n, measuring
the last qubit of UIP|x〉|0m〉 yields a · x with probability at least 12 + ε, it follows that
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
α2x ≥ 12 + ε (14)
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
β2x ≤ 12 − ε. (15)
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Now, consider the quantum circuit C in Figure 1.




n qubits
m qubits
X
H
H
H
H
H
H
UIP U
†
IP
Z
s
Figure 1: Quantum circuit C.
We will begin by showing that 〈a, 0m, 1|C|0n, 0m, 0〉 is real-valued and
〈a, 0m, 1|C|0n, 0m, 0〉 ≥ 2ε, (16)
which intuitively can be viewed as an indication of the progress that C makes towards finding the
string a. To establish Eq. 16, note that the operation C can be decomposed into the following five
operations:
1. Operation C1: Apply H to each of the first n qubits, and a NOT operation to the last qubit.
2. Operation C2: Apply UIP to the first n+m qubits.
3. Operation C3: Apply a controlled-Z to the last two qubits.
4. Operation C4: Apply U
†
IP to the first n+m qubits.
5. Operation C5: Apply H to each of the first n qubits.
Since 〈a, 0m, 1|C|0n, 0m, 0〉 = 〈a, 0m, 1|C5C4C3C2C1|0n, 0m, 0〉, the quantity 〈a, 0m, 1|C|0n, 0m, 0〉 is
the inner product between state C3C2C1|0n〉|0m〉|0〉 and state C†4C†5|a〉|0m〉|1〉. These states are
C3C2C1|0n〉|0m〉|0〉 = C3C2 1√2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉|0m〉|1〉
= C3
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 (αx|vx〉|a · x〉+ βx|wx〉|a · x〉) |1〉
= 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 (αx(−1)a·x|vx〉|a · x〉+ βx(−1)a·x|wx〉|a · x〉) |1〉
= 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)a·x|x〉 (αx|vx〉|a · x〉 − βx|wx〉|a · x〉) |1〉 (17)
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and
C†4C
†
5|a〉|0m〉|1〉 = C†4 1√2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)a·x|x〉|0m〉|1〉
= 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)a·x|x〉 (αx|vx〉|a · x〉+ βx|wx〉|a · x〉) |1〉. (18)
It follows from Eq. 17 and Eq. 18 (and using the fact that 〈x|y〉 = 0 whenever x 6= y) that
〈a, 0m, 1|C|0n, 0m, 0〉 = 12n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(
α2x − β2x
)
≥ (12 + ε)− (12 − ε)
= 2ε, (19)
which establishes Eq. 16.
Note that Eq. 16 implies that, if C is executed on input |0n〉|0m〉|0〉 (= |0n, 0m, 0〉) and the result
is measured in the classical basis, then the first n bits of the result will be a with probability at
least |〈a, 0m, 1|C|0n, 0m, 0〉|2 ≥ 4ε2. Therefore, if this process is repeated O(1/ε2) times, checking
each result with an EQ query, then a will be found with constant probability. A more efficient way
of finding the value of a is to use amplitude amplification [5, 15, 6] using the transformation C and
its inverse C† in combination with EQ queries. The procedure is to compute (for various values of
k)
(−CU0C†UEQ)kC|0n, 0m, 0〉 (20)
(where U0 = I−2|0n, 0m, 0〉〈0n, 0m, 0|), measure the state, and perform an EQ query on the result.
Such a computation consists of O(k) UIP, U
†
IP, and UEQ queries. As shown in [6], if this is carried
out for a suitably generated sequence of values of k, the expected total number of executions of C,
C†, and UEQ until a successful EQ query occurs is O(1/ε). This implies that O(1/ε) UIP, U
†
IP, and
UEQ are sufficient to succeed with constant probability.
3 Hard-predicates from one-way permutations
In this section, we give definitions pertaining to one-way permutations and hard-predicates (classical
and quantum versions) and investigate the complexity of the reduction of Goldreich and Levin [13]
from the former to the latter.2
In the definitions below, when we refer to the size of a classical [quantum] circuit, it is understood
to be relative to a suitable set of gates on one and two bits [qubits]. Quantum circuits compute
unitary transformations on quantum states; however, they can also be adapted to take classical
data as input and produce classical data as output. For a quantum circuit C acting on m qubits,
and x ∈ {0, 1}n (for n ≤ m), let Ck(x) (k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}), denote the result of measuring the first k
qubits of C|x〉|0m−n〉 in the classical basis. The subscript k may be omitted when the value of k is
clear from the context.
2The reduction makes sense for functions that are not permutations, but we restrict attention to permutations for
simplicity.
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Intuitively, a quantum one-way permutation f on n bits is easy to compute in the forward
direction but is hard to invert3. For the former property, the standard requirement is that f be
computable by a uniform circuit of size nO(1) (though it is also possible to impose other upper
bounds on the uniform circuit size). To quantify the latter property, it is helpful to first make the
following definition.
Definition 5 A permutation f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is classically [quantumly] (δ, T )-hard to invert
if there is no classical [quantum] circuit C of size T such that Pra[C(f(a)) = a] ≥ δ.
Now the standard requirement for the hard-to-invert condition is that f is (δ, T )-hard to invert
for all δ ∈ 1/nO(1) and T ∈ nO(1) (again, other bounds can be imposed). It should be noted
that, although it may be hard to determine a from f(a), it may not be hard to extract partial
information about a from f(a). For example, it is conceivable for a one-way permutation f to have
the property that half of the bits of a can be efficiently determined exactly from f(a). It is also
conceivable that each individual bit of a is efficiently predictable from f(a) with probability 34 . The
idea behind a hard-predicate [4] is to concentrate the information that a one-way function “hides”
about its input into a single bit. Intuitively, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a hard-predicate of f if, given
a ∈ {0, 1}n, it is easy to compute h(a); whereas, given f(a) for randomly chosen a ∈ {0, 1}n, it is
hard to predict the value of the bit h(a) with probability significantly better than 12 . One natural
way of quantifying how well a circuit predicts the value of h from the value of f is by the amount
that Pra[C(f(a)) = h(a)] exceeds
1
2 .
The hard-predicate defined in [13] is
h(y, x) = y · x, (21)
(the inner product modulo two of x and y), for (y, x) ∈ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n. This is not a hard-predicate
of f , but for a slightly modified version of f , as given in the following definition.
Definition 6 For a permutation f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, let f˜ denote the permutation f˜ : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n defined as
f˜(y, x) = (f(y), x), (22)
for all (y, x) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Note that the cost of computing [inverting] f˜ is essentially the same as the cost of computing [invert-
ing] f . Goldreich and Levin showed that if f is one-way then h is hard to predict from f˜ . Instead of
quantifying how well a circuit predicts h from f˜ as the amount by which Pry,x[C(f˜(y, x)) = h(y, x)]
exceeds 12 , we adopt a slightly more complicated definition. This definition is related to the above,
but is better suited for expressing the results in this section.
Definition 7 A circuit C (δ, ε)-predicts h from f˜ if
Pr
y
[Pr
x
[C(f˜(y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε] ≥ δ. (23)
To explain Eq. 23 in words, call y ∈ {0, 1}n ε-good if Prx[C(f˜(y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε for that
value of y. Then then Eq. 23 is equivalent to saying that Pry[y is ε-good] ≥ δ.
3The reversibility of quantum computations does not exclude this possibility [7].
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The following lemma, which relates the two measures of prediction, is straightforward to prove by
an averaging argument.
Lemma 3 If Pry,x[G(f˜(y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε then G (ε/(1 − ε), ε/2)-predicts h from f˜ .
Note that, if Pry,x[G(f˜ (y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12+1/nO(1) then G (1/nO(1), 1/nO(1))-predicts h from f˜ .
The classical Goldreich-Levin Theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4 ([13, 14]) If f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is classically (δ/2, T )-hard to invert then any
classical circuit that (δ, ε)-predicts h from f˜ must have size Ω(Tε2/n).
The proof of this theorem is essentially a reduction from the problem of inverting f to the problem
of (δ, ε)-predicting h. One begins by assuming that a circuit G of size o(Tε2/n) (δ, ε)-predicts
h from f˜ and then shows that, by making O(n/ε2) calls to both G and f (plus some additional
computations), f can be inverted with probability δ/2 [14]. The total running time of the inversion
procedure is o((n/ε2)(Tε2/n)) = o(T ), contradicting the fact that f is (δ/2, T )-hard to invert.
Our quantum version of the Goldreich-Levin Theorem is the following.
Theorem 5 If f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is quantumly (δ/2, T )-hard to invert then any quantum circuit
that (δ, ε)-predicts h from f˜ must have size Ω(Tε).
Proof: As in the classical case, the proof is essentially a reduction from the problem of inverting
f to the problem of (δ, ε)-predicting h. Let b = f(a) be an input instance—the goal is to determine
a from b. We will show how to simulate EQ and IP queries in this setting and then apply the
bounds in Theorem 2. It is easy to simulate an EQ query (relative to a) by making one call to f
and checking if the result is b. Suppose that there exists a circuit G of size o(Tε) that (δ, ε)-predicts
h from f˜ . Thus, Pry[Prx[G(f˜ (y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε] ≥ δ. Note that, with probability at least
δ, a is ε-good, in the sense that Prx[G(f˜ (a, x)) = h(a, x)] ≥ 12 + ε. When a is ε-good, computing
G(f˜(a, x)) = G(b, x) is simulating an IP query for x (relative to a). It follows from Theorem 2
that a can be computed with circuit-size o((1/ε)(Tε)) = o(T ) with success probability at least δ/2
(where 1/2 is the success probability of the algorithm that finds a when a is ε-good and δ is the
probability that a is ε-good to begin with). This contradicts the (δ/2, T )-hardness of inverting f ,
thus G cannot (δ, ε)-predict h from f˜ and be of size o(Tε).
To conclude this section, we give a proof that Theorem 4 cannot be improved quantitatively
assuming that it follows the structure of making calls to f and to an algorithm G that (δ, ε)-
predicts h from f˜ . More precisely, the setting is as follows. For a permutation f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, information is available from two types of black-box queries: f -queries that evaluates
f ; and G-queries that (δ, ε)-predict h from f˜ . More precisely, a G-query has the property that
Pry[Prx[G(f˜ (y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε] ≥ δ. A problem instance is b ∈ {0, 1}n (where b = f(a) for
a random a ∈ {0, 1}n) and the availability of f -queries and G-queries. The goal is to determine a
with probability δ/2 (say). Let us refer to this as the GL∗ problem (related to but different from
the GL problem defined in Section 2). From the proof of Theorem 4, the classical GL∗ problem can
be solved with O(n/ε2) f -queries and G-queries (and O(n2/ε2) auxiliary operations [14]). From
the proof of Theorem 5, a quantum version of the GL∗ problem can be solved with only O(1/ε)
f -queries and G-queries (and O(n/ε) auxiliary operations). The next theorem essentially implies
that the dilution factor n/ε2 in Theorem 4 cannot be reduced for a reasonable range of values of ε.
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Theorem 6 The classical GL∗ problem requires either Ω(2n/2) f -queries or Ω(n/ε2) G-queries,
whenever ε ≥ √n2−n/4.
Proof: The idea behind the proof is show that, starting with an algorithm that solves the GL∗
problem using Tf f -queries and TG G-queries, it is possible to simulate each f -query with one
EQ query and to simulate each G-query with one IP query and one EQ query. The result is an
algorithm that solves the GL problem defined in Section 2 with TG IP queries and Tf + TG EQ
queries. Then, applying the bound in Theorem 1, yields the required lower bounds.
By a basic game-theoretic argument [20], it suffices to consider deterministic algorithms, where
the input data—embodied by b, f , and G—are generated in a probabilistic manner. Let a ∈ {0, 1}n
be chosen randomly, f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a random permutation (chosen uniformly among the
2n! possibilities), and b = f(a). The function G is generated with the following property: for any
y, with probability at least δ, the condition Prx[G(f˜ (y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε holds. This property
implies Pry[Prx[G(f˜(y, x)) = h(y, x)] ≥ 12 + ε] ≥ δ.
The above probability distribution for b, f , and G can be generated in a number of ways,
including ways where the determination of parts of f is deferred until the course of the execution
of the algorithm solving the black-box problem. To illustrate this, first consider an algorithm that
uses only f -queries. It is possible to generate f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n randomly, choose a ∈ {0, 1}n
randomly, and set b = f(a). But this is stochastically equivalent to choosing a ∈ {0, 1}n randomly,
b ∈ {0, 1}n randomly and then, whenever an f -query with input x ∈ {0, 1}n occurs, doing the
following. If x = a then return b; if x has already occurred as the input to an f -query then return
the same value that was returned previously; otherwise, return a random element of {0, 1}n that is
different from b and from any values that have been returned from previous f -queries. The above
supposes that the value of a is available. If b is available but information about a is available only
via EQ queries then, in the above procedure, checking whether x = a can be replaced by performing
the query EQ(x). It is helpful to think about implementing the above process by building up a table
of values of f , initially empty. When an f -query with input x occurs, an EQ query is performed. If
EQ(x) = 1 then b is returned; otherwise, if the table has a value z in position x then z is returned;
otherwise, a random w ∈ {0, 1}n that is different from b and not in the table is inserted into position
x in the table and w is returned. This is the manner in which an f -query can be simulated by an
EQ query.
In a similar spirit, we can show that G-queries can be incorporated into this scenario and
simulated by IP queries and EQ queries. Prior to the execution of the algorithm, a flag bit s is set
to 1 with probability δ and to 0 with probability 1 − δ. Let the input to a G-query be (y, x). If
y = b and s = 1 then an IP query is performed and the result is returned. If y = b and s = 0 then
a random bit is returned. If y 6= b and y occurs in the table at position z then h(z, x) is returned.
If y 6= b and y does not occur in the table then y is placed in a random empty position z in the
table for which EQ(z) 6= 1 and h(z, x) is returned. In this manner, a G-query can be simulated by
at most one IP query and one EQ query.
What results from the above is a method of converting an algorithm that solves the GL∗ problem
with Tf f -queries and TG G-queries with success probability at least δ/2 into one that solves the
GL problem with TG IP queries and Tf +TG EQ queries with success probability δ/2. Conditioned
on s = 1, this algorithm for the GL problem must succeed with constant success probability unless
Tf ∈ Ω(2n/2). Therefore, by the lower bounds in Theorem 1, we have that Tf ∈ Ω(2n/2) or
TG ∈ Ω(n/ε2), as required.
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4 Quantum bit commitment from quantum one-way permutations
In this section, we show how to use the quantum Goldreich-Levin Theorem to construct a quantum
bit commitment scheme from a quantum one-way permutation.
Definition 8 A permutation f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a quantum one-way permutation if:
• There is a uniform quantum circuit of size nO(1) that computes f(x) from x.
• f is quantumly (δ, T )-hard to invert for any δ ∈ 1/nO(1) and T ∈ nO(1).
Theorem 7 If there exists a quantum one-way permutation f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n then there exists
a bit [or qubit] commitment scheme that is perfectly binding and computationally concealing, in
the sense that the committed bit cannot be predicted with probability 12 + 1/n
O(1) by a circuit of
size nO(1).
Proof: From Theorem 5, it is straightforward to construct a quantum bit commitment scheme
from Alice to Bob based on a one-way permutation f as follows (where h(y, x) = y · x).
Bit-commit Let z ∈ {0, 1} be the bit to commit to. Alice chooses a, x ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, and
sets c = z ⊕ h(a, x). Alice computes b = f(a) and sends (b, x, c) to Bob.
Bit-decommit Alice sends a to Bob. Bob checks if f(a) = b and rejects if this is not the case.
Otherwise, Bob accepts and computes c⊕ h(a, x) as the bit.
Since f is a permutation there is at most one classical value of a that is an acceptable decom-
mitment of Alice’s bit. This implies that the scheme is perfectly binding to Alice. Note that the
model could be relaxed to permit Alice to send quantum data to Bob, by adjusting Bob’s protocol
to immediately perform a measurement (in the classical basis) on any data that he receives from
Alice. There would be no advantage to Alice—she could not somehow “commit to more than
one value” by sending commitments in superposition. This is because the adjusted protocol is
equivalent to one where Alice performs the measurement herself on any data before sending it to
Bob.
Theorem 5 implies that the scheme is also computationally concealing, since any nO(1)-size
circuit that enables Bob to guess z from (b, x, c) with probability 12 + 1/n
O(1) can be converted to
a nO(1)-size circuit that inverts f with probability 1/nO(1), violating the fact that f is one-way.
Finally, we explain how a qubit commitment scheme can be constructed using some of the ideas
in [1]. Recall the standard notation for the Pauli matrices:
X = σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and Z = σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (24)
Qubit-commit Let |ψ〉 be the qubit to commit to. Alice chooses a1, a2, x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n randomly,
and constructs the state |ψ′〉 = Xh(a1,x1)Zh(a2,x2)|ψ〉 and also computes b1 = f(a1) and
b2 = f(a2). Alice sends (|ψ′〉, b1, b2, x1, x2) to Bob.
Qubit-decommit Alice sends a1, a2 to Bob. Bob checks if f(a1) = b1 and f(a2) = b2, rejecting if
this is not the case. Otherwise, Bob accepts and computes Zh(a2,x2)Xh(a1,x1)|ψ′〉 as the qubit.
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Clearly, the scheme is perfectly binding. Intuitively, the scheme is computationally concealing,
because h(a1, x1) and h(a2, x2) “look random” to Bob. If Bob can use his information to efficiently
significantly distinguish between the qubit that he receives from Alice in the commitment stage
and a totally mixed state (density matrix 12I) then this procedure can be adapted to distinguish
between the pair of bits r1 = h(a1, x1) and r2 = h(a2, x2) and a pair of truly random bits, which
would lead to a procedure that violated the result proven in Theorem 5.
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